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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the underlying dynamics of selected euro-area sovereign bonds by 
employing a factor-augmenting vector autoregressive (FAVAR) model for the first time in 
the literature. This methodology allows for identifying the underlying transmission 
mechanisms of several factors; in particular, market liquidity and credit risk. Departing 
from the classical structural vector autoregressive (VAR) models, it allows us to relax 
limitations regarding the choice of variables that could drive spreads and credit default 
swaps (CDSs) of euro-area sovereign debts. The results show that liquidity, credit risk, and 
flight to quality drive both spreads and CDSs of five years’ maturity over swaps for Greece 
and Ireland in recent years. Greece, in particular, is facing an elastic demand for its 
sovereign bonds that further stretches liquidity. Moreover, in current illiquid market 
conditions spreads will continue to follow a steep upward trend, with certain adverse 
financial stability implications. In addition, we observe a negative feedback effect from 
counterparty credit risk.  
Keywords: Sovereign Debt Crisis; Spreads; CDS; FAVAR Model; Greece and Ireland  
JEL Classifications: C32, G00, G01  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Recent events of the euro-area sovereign debt crisis could very well indeed resemble a novel 
version of ancient tragedy. Euro-area sovereign debt crisis has its origin back in the late 
1970s, yet it was in December 2009 that it burst, leading the spreads over bond and credit 
default swaps (CDSs) to unprecedented levels. It all started with the Greek tragedy that is 
slowly spreading out to other member states of the Euro-area, such as Ireland and Portugal.  
The event that triggered the euro-area sovereign debt crisis can be traced back to the 
second half of 2007, when the sub-prime crisis sent big waves of distress across the financial 
markets. But in the second half of 2007 it was still in its early days, as the interest rate on the 
10-year maturity Irish sovereign bond was lower than the rate of the German sovereign 
bond. However, soon into 2008, the Irish rates started rising whereas the German rates 
remained low. The spreads between Greek and German rates also rose rapidly during the 
same period, and in fact the Greek spreads lead a race to the top that lead to spreads of above 
1000 basis points by summer 2010. Effectively, although only in 2007, it would have been 
unheard of to claim that a member state of the euro-group could default
1
, the stratospheric 
recent Greek spreads show the magnitude of the crisis and the market’s perception that 
Greece faces a very high risk of default.  
In the credit risk models literature (see Duffle and Singleton 1999; Hull and White 
2000), it is argued that there could be an arbitrage type of relationship between CDSs and 
credit spreads for a given level of maturity. Duffle (1999) argues that this type of arbitrage 
would imply that the CDS prices and the credit spreads share a cointegration relationship. A 
cointegration relationship between the CDSs and European Union (EU) corporate spreads is 
also reported in Norden and Weber (2004), Zhu (2006), and De Wit (2006). Along these 
lines, Blanco et al. (2005) show that there is a long run relationship between corporate bonds 
and CDS markets in the US. Moreover, Blanco et al. (2005) argue that there is an 
equivalence of CDSs and spreads that dictates a cointegration relationship between the two 
for corporate bonds in US.
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1
 The introduction of the euro in 2001 has brought convergence in the spreads of sovereign debts across 
member states, insinuating a process of economic and financial integration. Alas, by the end of this decade, all 
have changed and expectations about the future appear gloomy. External shocks, in light of the subprime crisis, 
play an important role in the widening of sovereign spreads in the eurozone. However, what the Greek 
sovereign debt crisis reveals is that there are deeply rooted domestic factors that affect spreads. As a result, 
even if global financial constraints may ease, some Greek spreads would not drop. 
2
 One could consider that CDS is an insurance that the holder of, for example, Greek sovereign debt, buys 
against the event of default. To define a default event is not an easy task. There are various events that could be 
considered default, such as; bankruptcy, failure to pay, obligation default or acceleration, repudiation or 
moratorium (for sovereign entities), or restructuring. The last one, restructuring, has steered some heated 
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We depart from the above literature, as our goal is to contribute by employing, for 
the first time, factor augmenting vector autoregressive VAR methodology (FAVAR 
thereafter). The main advantage of FAVAR compared to VAR is that the latter involves only 
a few variables. Thus, it is certain that the full information context of responses is lost. 
FAVAR, on the other hand, allows for examining the underlying responses of CDSs and 
spreads of euro-area sovereign bonds to innovations in a plethora of variables by identifying 
the full transmission mechanisms at play.  
The rest of this article is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a brief literature 
review of existing studies that have looked at sovereign debt crisis. Section 3 presents some 
stylized facts of the Greek and Irish sovereign debt crisis, while Section 4 outlines the 
methodology employed. Section 5 discusses the data, including dates of potential structural 
breaks. Section 6 presents the results, and finally Section 7 discusses the implications of the 
results. 
   
2. STYLIZED FACTS OF THE EURO-AREA SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS 
In the third week of July 2007, when the subprime crisis was just placing the world on 
notice, the yield (interest rate) on the 10-year maturity Irish sovereign bond was lower than 
the yield on a comparable German sovereign bond. Then, as Irish rates started rising, 
German rates remained low, with a tendency even to fall as investors sought safety. The 
spread between Irish and German yields rose rapidly: in the last week of January 2009, the 
Irish sovereign bond paid about 260 basis points more than the German bond.  This spread—
or risk premium—has fluctuated since, but remains near its highest level since the formation 
of the eurozone. The size of the spread and, particularly, the swing in a matter of 18 months 
make Ireland stand out, possibly along with Greece. However, spreads have increased 
substantially throughout the Euro-area. The spreads are the market’s measure of a country’s 
risk of default. While even at the currently elevated levels, the perceived probability of 
default remains relatively low, markets have determined that higher risk premia are 
warranted, and more so for some countries. 
These striking developments follow several years of tranquility in eurozone bond 
markets. After the introduction of the euro in January 1999 and up until the subprime crisis 
hit global financial markets in mid-July 2007, spreads on bonds of eurozone members had 
                                                                                                                                                      
debates in the CDS market. According to the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), 
restructuring is a default event in case that the interest rate or the principal paid at maturity are lowered or 
delayed.  
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moved in a narrow range with only modest differentiation across countries (Figure 1B). The 
stability and convergence of spreads was considered a hallmark of successful financial 
integration within the eurozone. The ongoing instability and divergence have raised far-
reaching questions. Some have even been led to question the viability of the euro as a 
common currency. 
For policymakers, there may be some comfort in the recognition that the wider 
spreads are due, in the first instance, to external factors. Global financial stress, having 
infected a widening range of financial asset classes, has also fed through to the bonds of 
eurozone sovereigns. If the potency of these common external factors is mitigated over time, 
spreads should come down. But while common factors have played their role, they do not 
explain the increased dispersion of spreads. Thus, the wider and more diverse spreads could 
also reflect domestic vulnerabilities. The implication is that higher spreads could persist 
since the financial vulnerabilities uncovered by the global crisis and weaker growth 
prospects have the potential to reinforce each other.  
Moreover, over the past year, Euro-area sovereign yields have exhibited an 
unprecedented degree of volatility. In March 2009, the spread between the yield on a 10-year 
Greek government bond and the yield on a German Bund of equivalent maturity was as high 
as 280 basis points (bp). By September 2009, the same spread had dropped below 120 bp. In 
January 2010, it had climbed back up to over 380 bp.  Alas, things got worst over recent 
months; in April 2010 the spread reached 670 bp only  to climb even higher to the level of 
1287 bp in May 2010, the month that the Emergency Financing Mechanism (EFM) and the 
memorandum of understanding regarding policy conditionality, a joint initiative of the IMF, 
the EU Commission, and the European Central Bank (ECB) were signed. In July 2010, it 
registered some decline to 770 bp, only to start rising again to above 820 bp in August 2010. 
Likewise, the credit default swap, the premium investors are willing to pay to insure the 
same Greek bond against a credit event, follows a similar trajectory as the spread. Note that, 
although spreads of other Euro-area member states also exhibit a positive slope, no other 
sovereign bond spread has followed a similar trajectory as the Greek spread.  
Moreover, four distinct phases can be identified. July 2007–September 2008 marked 
the phase of financial crisis build-up, spreads remained within a relatively narrow, albeit 
widening, range. Between October 2008 and March 2009, there was a systemic outbreak due 
to the collapse of Lehman Brothers; sovereign spreads started diverging markedly. With the 
exception of German Bunds, Euro-area government bond yields moved sharply above the 
swap yield, as problems in the banking sector spilled over to sovereign balance sheets. 
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April–September 2009 characterized the systemic response phase; spreads converged, 
although at wider levels. As financial spillovers were contained and systemic risk subsided, 
all bond yields fell back closer to the level of the swap yield, particularly those which had 
gone up considerably in the earlier phase. Finally, beginning in October 2009, rising 
idiosyncratic sovereign risk led to greater differentiation among countries, with the yields on 
specific government bonds climbing to record highs. Then, in December 2009, the Greek 
sovereign debt crisis burst that led spreads and CDSs to unprecedented levels. And while in 
the beginning it appeared as if the Greek tragedy would expand to other member states of the 
Euro-area, it soon became clear that the markets perceived the Greek case as in a class of its 
own with no other members.  
Starting with the onset of the subprime crisis in mid-July of 2007 and going through 
to the rescue of Bear Stearns in mid-March 2008, the variation in sovereign spreads is no 
longer white noise. The change in spreads is related to “global factors,” both flight to quality 
(captured by the response to changes in the German Bund yield) and global financial risk (as 
proxied by the change in the CDS spreads of US banks). Thus, the global factors that were 
seen as associated with change in spreads in the overall regression are seen to dominate in 
this first phase of the crisis. Two implications follow. First, global risk aversion, which was 
spreading to various asset classes, became a perceptible factor in the sovereign bond 
markets—what is remarkable is that this occurred so early in the evolution of the crisis. 
Second, at least as first approximation, these factors influenced all countries equally 
(interacting them with country dummies did not lead to clear results), and, as such, there was 
a general tendency for spreads to rise with minimal country differentiation. 
Starting with the rescue of Bear Stearns, three trends are noticeable. First, the 
influence of the identifiable global factors steadily declined. Similarly, the (partial) 
correlation between the change in CDS spreads of US banks and the change in eurozone 
sovereign spreads declined. Second, external factors did play a role in the post-Bear Stearns 
phase, but this was so in a less pinpointed sense and reflected after Lehman in a general 
upward pressure on spreads, proxied by the dummy for that last period. Finally, the big 
change in the post-Bear Stearns phase was the important role of domestic factors, 
represented by the market’s assessment of financial sector prospects. This was the source of 
spreads’ differentiation. 
Thus, Bear Stearns marked an important turning point in the crisis as seen through 
the lens of eurozone sovereign spreads. The debate on whether or not Bear Stearns should 
have been bailed out has hinged on the risk of moral hazard—critics have warned that bank 
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managers will become even more irresponsible, while proponents of the rescue have been 
focused on the stability of the financial system. Even as that debate plays out, the data show 
that there was an immediate impact. The implicit assumption that systemically important 
banks would typically be bailed out was converted into an explicit and close tie between 
banks and the dynamics of public finance. Interestingly, the Bear Stearns rescue initially 
generated optimism that the financial sector had become safer, and sovereign spreads fell. 
However, that optimism lasted briefly. Two months later, by mid-May 2008, the financial 
sector was being perceived as increasingly weaker and sovereign spreads were, once again, 
on the rise. Thus, although these dynamics became more pronounced after Lehman, the 
process had already commenced some months earlier. 
The final phase of these developments followed the nationalization of Anglo Irish 
Bank. Relative to Bear Stearns, the other bookend of this story, Anglo Irish is a small bank 
and its nationalization likely did not carry the same market significance as the Bear Stearns 
rescue. Moreover, the Anglo Irish nationalization came at a time when the global “mood 
music” was particularly gloomy. But, it is the case that markets moved rapidly. Viewed by 
the authorities as systemically important to the Irish financial system, the beleaguered Anglo 
Irish was nationalized late on the evening of Thursday, January 15, 2009. On Friday 
morning, the share prices of the other major Irish banks—Allied Irish Banks and the Bank of 
Ireland—fell sharply, by 12.9 and 13.3 percent, respectively. This was the trigger to a new 
burst of anxiety as financial stocks got hammered and sovereign spreads soared, in Ireland 
and elsewhere in the eurozone. In the terminology of this paper, the Irish “F-index,” i.e., the 
ratio of its financial sector equity index to the overall equity index, had experienced a 
modest revival after Christmas, rising from 21 in the week starting December 26, 2008 to 24 
in the week starting January 9, 2009 (despite the sharp fall in financial sector stocks on the 
Friday of that week). The F-index then fell back 21 in the week starting January 16 and with 
that fall, Irish sovereign spreads jumped by sizeable 32 basis points, almost 20 percent over 
the previous week’s average of 142 basis points. In the week starting January 23, the F-index 
dived to 14 and the sovereign spreads rose a stunning 80 basis points to 260 basis points, 
almost 50 percent over the previous week’s average. 
The same story played itself out through much of the eurozone. As in Ireland, the F-
index had stabilized elsewhere. After Christmas, the average F-index in the other nine 
eurozone countries in my sample had been stable—though, relative to Ireland, at the much 
higher level of 77. This index fell by 2 points in the week starting January 16 and spreads 
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jumped by 16 basis points, from 95 to 111 basis points. Then a further fall of the F-index by 
3 points was associated with a rise in spreads to 123 basis points. 
Thus, a significant shift occurred in the second half of January 2009 as the financial 
sector appeared to weaken further and sovereign spreads climbed rapidly. It was as if some 
threshold had been crossed, triggering a surge in spreads. However, it is also evident that 
countries were differentiated even in the midst of these sweeping changes. To explore 
country differences, the data for the estimations presented in Table 5 is extended to include 
weeks of January 16 and January 23. Recognizing that the developments during this period 
were special, I add a post-Anglo Irish dummy for these two weeks. This dummy is interacted 
in column 1 with the level of the F-index. The hypothesis is that spreads moved not just in 
response to the changes in the F-index as had been the case since the Bear Stearns rescue. 
Rather there was an accelerated transition to higher spreads responding to the level of the F-
index, as if markets were recalibrating to the cumulative deterioration of financial sector 
prospects. 
Thus, in the last two weeks of January, an ongoing process was accelerated. While in 
the period leading up to mid-January, changes in financial vulnerability were followed by a 
rise in spreads, in the final weeks of January, spreads responded to the level of vulnerability. 
Markets evidently decided that they had some catching up to do. And that catch-up had a 
tangible goal in some countries. For the most part, spreads on banks’ own debt had been 
higher than on sovereign spreads from the start of the subprime crisis. This was true for 
much of the period and for most countries. Only in Italy and Portugal, bank and sovereign 
spreads had converged, with sovereign spreads actually rising above bank spreads sometime 
after the fall of Lehman Brothers. The last two weeks of January saw a wider convergence of 
spreads: even as sovereign spreads rose, bank spreads fell as if the sovereign had taken on 
the risk of the financial sector. After those two dramatic weeks, bank spreads had once again 
typically been higher than sovereign spreads. However, the significance of the last two 
weeks of January appears to be that sovereign and bank risks caught up with each other and 
tended thereafter to exhibit more co-movement rather than the lagged relationship observed 
in the previous months. 
Despite this evidence, to this day there is not a comprehensive account of what has 
happened in the market with reference to the euro-area sovereign debt crisis. Financial 
market theory suggests that CDS spreads and corporate bond spreads for the same entities 
are bound by no-arbitrage conditions. By ignoring differences in liquidity and assuming that 
the maturity of the corporate debt equals that of the CDS, an investor who acquires a 
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corporate bond and buys protection for the same reference entity in the CDS market should 
be hedged against the default of this particular firm. The implied no-arbitrage assumption 
between the two markets suggests that the price of buying such a protection against default 
in the CDS markets should equal the observed corporate bond yield spread. 
A long-term relationship between the two credit markets for European entities was 
documented by Norden and Weber (2004), Zhu (2006) and De Wit (2006). Overall, most 
previous studies found the existence of a long-term (co-integrating) relationship between the 
two markets for the bulk of the entities examined. The existence of a long-run relationship 
between the two markets does not, however, exclude short-run arbitrage opportunities. Levin 
et al. (2005) argue that market frictions are the main cause of non-zero CDS-bond spread 
basis. The authors argue that these market frictions are caused by systematic and 
idiosyncratic factors. Forte and Pena (2006) show that, in terms of price discovery, stock 
markets lead both bond and CDS markets. Concentrating on the CDS and bond markets, 
Doetz (2007) studies the price discovery in these two markets in a time-variant context. The 
results indicate that although the CDS market slightly dominates the price discovery process, 
its contribution fell significantly during the 2005 turbulence when General Motors and Ford 
were downgraded by the rating agencies from investment grade to ”junk” grade. 
 
3. THE MARKET OF CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS AND CREDIT SPREADS: HOW 
THEY OPERATE 
In a credit default swap, the protection seller agrees to pay the default payment to the 
protection buyer if a default event has happened before maturity of the contract. If there is no 
default event before maturity, the protection seller pays nothing. The protection seller 
charges a fee for the protection. This is typically a constant quarterly fee paid until default or 
maturity, whichever is first. Should a default event happen, the accrued fee is also paid. We 
refer to the annualized fee as the credit default swap price. The default payment is either 
repayment at par against physical delivery of a reference asset (physical settlement) or the 
notional amount minus the post-default market value of the reference asset determined by a 
dealer poll (cash settlement).  
Physical delivery is the dominant form of settlement in the market. A broad set of 
debt obligations is deliverable as long as they rank pari passu with the senior unsecured 
indebtedness of the reference entity. Default events for CDSs might include some or all of 
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the following: bankruptcy, failure to pay, obligation default or acceleration, repudiation or 
moratorium (for sovereign entities), and restructuring. 
The first four are not contentious, although the evolving International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association (ISDA) documentation has dropped events obligation default or 
acceleration and repudiation or moratorium in some jurisdictions since they have been 
deemed subsumed by events bankruptcy—failure to pay. Restructuring has been and remains 
a source of controversy in the CDS market. The 1999 ISDA documentation defines 
restructuring to constitute a default event if either the interest rate or principal paid at 
maturity are reduced or delayed, if an obligation’s ranking in payment priority is lowered, or 
if there is a change in currency or composition of any payment (excluding adoption of the 
euro by a member state of the European Union). The key problem is that not all deliverable 
assets necessarily become due and payable should restructuring occur, and it is conceivable 
that some deliverable obligations will be cheaper than others. This is likely to be particularly 
acute where deliverable assets include very long-dated or convertible bonds that often trade 
at a discount to shorter-dated straight bonds. This means that where there is a non-negligible 
probability of a restructuring that falls short of making all debt due and payable and where 
some obligations trade at a substantial discount to others, then a physically-settled CDS price 
also contains a cheapest-to-deliver (CTD) option and is not a pure measure of credit risk. 
European CDSs traded on the basis of this definition throughout our data sample. US CDSs 
have been subject to a Modified Restructuring definition since May 11, 2001 that, among 
other aspects, restricted the scope of deliverable assets and specifically prevents the delivery 
of very long-dated bonds. This reduces the value of the delivery option in US default swaps. 
There is a large and growing literature on the pricing of credit risk, within which two 
approaches dominate. Structural models are based on the value of the firm and are usually 
derived from Merton (1974). In this class of models, default occurs when the process 
describing the value of the firm hits a given boundary. Black and Cox (1976), Geske (1977) 
and Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) are three of many important references. Das (1995) and 
Pierides (1997) apply structural models to the pricing of credit derivatives. The second 
approach, usually termed reduced-form or intensity-based models, instead assume that the 
timing of default is specified in terms of a hazard rate. Leading reduced-form frameworks 
would include Jarrow and Turnbull (1995), Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull (1997) and Duffie 
and Singleton (1999). Das and Sundaram (1998), Duffie (1999) and Hull and White (2000) 
apply reduced-form models to credit derivative pricing issues. Both structural and reduced-
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form approaches are very comprehensively surveyed in Lando (1997) and Schonbucher 
(2000). 
The spread on par fixed-coupon risky bond over the par fixed-coupon risk-free bond 
exactly equals the CDS price if the payment dates on the CDS and bond coincide and 
recovery on default is a constant fraction of face value (Houweling and Vorst 2002). 
Alternatively, with a flat risk-free curve and constant interest rates, the arbitrage is perfect if 
the payout from a CDS on default is the sum of the principal amount plus accrued interest on 
a risky par yield bond times one, minus the recovery rate (Hull and White 2000). As noted 
above, however, the payout from a CDS usually equals the principal amount minus the 
recovery rate times the sum of principal and accrued interest on the reference obligation. 
Nevertheless the referenced papers show that the arbitrage is reasonably accurate for assets 
trading close to par when interest rates are not high and yield curves are relatively flat. Three 
other considerations are relevant. First, physically-settled CDS prices, especially for 
European entities, may contain CTD options as noted above. Other things equal, this will 
lead CDS prices to be greater than the credit spread.  
Unfortunately, it is impossible to value this option analytically since there is no 
benchmark for the post-default behavior of deliverable bonds, and hence we cannot simply 
subtract its value from the CDS price. Second, the arbitrage relationship that should keep the 
two prices together can rely on short selling the cash bond. This is not always costless and 
indeed is not always even possible in illiquid corporate bond markets. If the repo cost of 
shorting the cash bond is significant, then the credit spread we have computed (bond yield 
minus the risk-free rate) underestimates the true credit spread (bond yield minus risk-free 
rate plus the repo cost). Again, the CDS price will tend to be greater than the measured credit 
spread (Duffie 1999). Although both the CTD option and non-zero repo costs can occur 
independently, when a firm’s credit risk increases, the demand to short sell the bond rises, 
driving up the repo cost, and the value of the CTD option rises. Neither market then provides 
a pure measure of credit risk. Quantifying these two factors is difficult in the absence of 
reliable repo cost data or a valuation model for the option. However, since both the repo cost 
and the option value are bounded at zero, we can say that the CDS price is an upper limit on 
the price of credit risk while the credit spread provides a lower limit. 
Third, liquidity premia exist in both the cash bond and CDS markets. The cash bond 
market is often described as relatively illiquid, particularly outside the United States. 
Movements in liquidity premia may explain a large proportion of the total variation in credit 
spreads (Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin 2001). The CDS market is still relatively 
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small despite its rapid recent growth, and so demand-supply imbalances can often cause 
short-term price movements unrelated to default expectations.  
 
4. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE FAVAR 
Following Bernanke et al. (2005), let St be a M ×1 vector of sovereign debt spreads and 
CDSs assumed to drive the underlying dynamics of the sovereign debt. The main point of 
this paper is to reveal the underlying structural relationships among these spreads. In the 
current FAVAR modelling, we assume that there exists additional information that is within 
a K ×1 vector of unobserved factors, Ft , where K is “small.” These unobserved factors could 
be market specific, such as migration risk, which is credit downgrading, and counter party 
risk or reflecting numerous economic factors, such as growth rates. Last, there is also a 
vector of some known, observable Zt variables that could have an impact on spreads. The 
FAVAR model is: 
Sit = β0i +βiFt + βiΖt + εit                                                  (1) 
where F  is an N × K matrix of factor loadings, Z  is N ×M , and the N ×1 vector of error 
terms ε  are mean zero and will be assumed either normal and uncorrelated or to display a 
small amount of cross-correlation, depending on whether estimation is by likelihood 
methods or principal components.   
Assume that the joint dynamics of (St ,Zt) are given by the following transition 
equation: 
t
t
t
t
t
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1
)(                            (2) 
where (St ,Zt ) is a vector of spread and Z variables that could have an impact,  Φ(L) is a 
conformable lag polynomial of finite order d, which may contain a priori restrictions as in 
the structural VAR literature. The error term νt is mean zero with covariance matrix Q. 
The above equation is a VAR in (St, Zt ). It might be interpreted as the reduced form 
of a linear sovereign debt model involving both observed and unobserved variables. This 
system reduces to a standard VAR in St  if the terms of Φ(L) that relate St  to Z t−1 are all 
zero.  
Because the FAVAR model nests standard VAR analyses, estimation of this equation 
allows for easy comparison with existing VAR results, and provides a way of assessing the 
marginal contribution of the additional information contained in Zt . We assume that the 
informational time series Zt are related to the unobservable factors Ft and the observed 
variables St. 
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This equation captures the idea that both Ft and Zt, which in general can be 
correlated, represent common forces that drive the dynamics of St. Conditional on St, the Zt 
are thus noisy measures of the underlying unobserved factors Ft. St depends on the 
contemporaneous levels of independent variables (factors), while Zt is interpreted as 
including a number of certain lags of the fundamental factors. 
 
5. THE DATA SET 
The sovereign spread for Greece and Ireland at time “t” (Srdt) is measured as the difference 
between secondary-market yield on the country’s 5-year bond and the swaps yield. On the 
other hand, the CDS for 5-year maturity is also spread with respect to the swaps yield. CDS 
reflects an insurance premium paid by the market’s participants against default. To this end, 
CDS provides a forward looking picture of spreads. Both the spread and the 5-year maturity 
CDS are derived from Bloomberg.  
We opt for the following factors to examine their impact on sovereign CDS spreads 
as well as in sovereign bond spreads. First, we take proxies for credit risk: i) The risk-free 
rate; as the Merton (1974) model shows that changes in the risk-free rate in general are 
negatively related to credit spreads. A rising risk-free rate decreases the present value of the 
expected future cash flows of sovereign bonds and the price of the put option decreases. As a 
Euro-wide homogeneous proxy, we use the Euribor three-month short rate. ii) Corporate 
CDS premium (iTraxx); as credit spreads compensate investors for more than pure expected 
loss, this premium is a measure of aggregate credit market developments, namely the iTraxx 
Main Investment Grade index. The premium on this CDS index should also contain a proxy 
for investors’ overall appetite for credit risk. Second, we opt for a proxy of country’s public 
debt. In structural models of sovereign credit risk (Gapen et al. 2005), a firm’s leverage 
defined as the ratio of debt to its assets is a major risk factor. This risk factor is also 
acknowledged in a fiscal policy perspective as the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact aims to 
cap a country’s total debt at 60 percent of its GDP. As a proxy, we use a country’s total 
outstanding bonds relative to its GDP. This choice of variable is motivated by data 
availability, as the amount of bonds outstanding is available in Bloomberg on a monthly 
frequency. We expect that higher debt increases CDS spreads. For sovereign bonds, in a 
market with elastic demand, this variable reflects bond market liquidity because a larger 
bond market generally contributes to lower transaction costs. However, if overall supply of 
new issuance exceeds existing demand, then there could also be an adverse impact on bond 
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market liquidity. We expect the second effect to be primarily relevant for bond spreads. Last, 
we also employ the spread between Euribor-Eurepo.  This variable is expected to assert a 
positive impact on the spreads. When the repo rate is lower than the Euribor, it is costly to 
implement a positive basis trade, which implies short-selling the underlying bond obtained 
via repurchase agreement and selling protection. 
 
6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
6.1 Empirical Estimation 
The underlying VAR of our model takes the following form: 
ttt uASS 1                                           (3) 
Where St represents the spreads and CDSs for Greece and Ireland. To simplify notation, we 
include in S vector also the Z variables, namely the Euribor three-month short rate, Europe 
three-month repo, the corporate CDS premium (iTraxx), country’s total outstanding bonds 
relative to its GDP, and the spread between Euribor-Eurepo.  
From the above VAR we get the following FAVAR: 
t
t
t
t
t
v
F
S
L
F
S
1
1
)(                                        (4) 
Where Ft = (F1t; F2t) are two factors we get from the following steps. In the first of the steps, 
we regress the S to Z as Zit = ΛiSt + εit, where Λ is a latent variable. In this paper, we employ 
two latent variables, thus the unobserved factors are two. We construct the factors F from Zit 
- ΛiSt N by applying the principal component method. In the second step, we impose 
Choleski ordering and employ the unobservable factor F from the first step in a simple 
recursive framework. In the ordering, we opt to first insert spread and CDS. The remaining 
variables that are observables are assumed to respond to spread and CDS, that is, to 
sovereign debt crisis variables. Two lags are employed in the FAVAR. 
 
6.2 FAVAR Specification 
Next, we report the FAVAR specifications for Greece and Ireland. It appears that most 
factors are jointly significant.  
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Table 1 FAVAR specifications for Greece 
 CDS Spread Euribor
3M  
Eurepo 
3M 
iTraxx debt Euribor-
Eurepo 
Adj. R
2
 0.4842 0.6806 0.55119 0.7642 0.1211 0.4842 0.6806 
S.E. 0.0677 0.0134 0.30860 0.1642 0.3711 0.0677 0.0134 
X
2
 18.09 14.097 12.365 14.066 10.011 16.089 17.047 
        
Note: CDS counts for the CDSs of Greece, Spread for Greece. 
 
Table 2 FAVAR specifications for Ireland 
 CDS Spread Euribor
3M  
Eurepo 
3M 
iTraxx debt Euribor-
Eurepo 
Adj. R
2
 0.1044 0.3420 0.57531 0.1445 0.2910 0.10442 0.3423 
S.E. 0.0809 0.04097 0.03653 0.0616 0.011 0.0809 0.0407 
 X
2
 13.44 10.6420 15.7531 14.145 18.291 14.442 19.423 
        
Note: CDS counts for the CDSs of Ireland, Spread for Ireland. 
 
6.3 FAVAR Impulse Response Functions 
Next, we report the impulse response function (IRF) from the FAVAR. First we look at a 
shock on the risk-free rate, as we expect that changes in the risk free rate, in general, to be 
negatively related to sovereign debt spreads.
3
 IRFs, both Greece and Ireland, confirm this. 
Thus, a shock in the risk free rate, for example an increase in risk-free rate, would decrease 
the present value of the expected future cash flows of sovereign debt, and thus should lower 
the credit spread.  
 
Figure 1 Impulse response of Greek spread over swaps to Euribor 3M 
 
                                                 
3
 Similar IRFs, as appear in this section, are reported in the Appendix with respect to the response of CDS. 
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Figure 2 Impulse response of Irish spread over swaps to Euribor 3M 
 
 
The shock in the Eurepo has a positive impact on the spread. An increase in repo rate means 
that it is costly to implement a positive basis trade, and this would raise the spread of 
sovereign debt contributing in financial instability. 
 
Figure 3 Impulse response of Greek spread over swaps to Eurepo 3M 
 
 
Figure 4 Impulse response of Irish spread over swaps to Eurepo 3M 
 
 
We also employ a shock in corporate CDS premium, which is iTraxx. The response of 
spread on a shock in corporate CDS is positive, though it declines over time, reflecting 
investors’ overall appetite for credit risk.  
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Figure 5 Impulse response of Greek spread over swaps to iTraxx 
 
 
Figure 6 Impulse response of Greek spread over swaps to iTraxx 
 
 
An important transmission channel is the fiscal imbalances. We find that higher debt 
increases spreads of sovereign debt in the first period or so, but then it asserts a negative 
impact for Greece.
4
 Effectively, sovereign issuance of Greek bonds is facing an elastic 
demand, and shows the limits of bond market liquidity. Thus, as overall supply of new 
sovereign issuance bonds exceeds existing demand, and as a result it has an adverse impact 
on bond market liquidity.  
 
Figure 7 Impulse response of Greek spread over swaps to debt 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 For Ireland, we get a different picture, as the fiscal transmission mechanism asserts a positive impact on 
spreads. 
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Figure 8 Impulse response of Irish spread over swaps to debt 
 
We also employ the difference between Euribor-Eurepo.  The results show that the response 
of spreads to a shock in the difference between Euribor-Eurepo is positive throughout the 
period. As the repo rate is lower than the Euribor, it becomes costly for the market 
participants to arbitrage by short-selling the underlying bond obtained via repurchase 
agreements and selling protections in the form of CDS. 
 
Figure 9 Impulse response of Greek spread over swaps to the difference between Euribor and Eurepo 3M 
 
 
Figure 10 Impulse response of Irish spread over swaps to the difference between Euribor and Eurepo 3M. 
 
 
 
Overall, the above results show negative feedback effects from counterparty risk, which is 
defined as creditworthiness of loans providers, such as the EU member states and the IMF, 
that impact spreads and CDS dynamics. Note, however, that as liquidity risk increases across 
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the euro-area in terms of the available funds, it becomes an issue and essentially default 
protection against default is no longer valuable.   
 
7. Conclusion 
Duffie (2010) argues that high CDS for corporate bonds in the US after the credit crunch 
persisted due to severe depletion of capital that in turn caused large distortions in arbitrage, 
and to a lesser extent due to counterparty risk or default risk. This could be the case as the 
current FAVAR analysis shows for the euro-area sovereign debt crisis.  
Both Greece and Ireland appear to be within a cyclone, as in the present conditions of 
debt crisis markets are short of capital, whilst in parallel banks are undercapitalised. This 
depletion of capital poses a great challenge for euro-area sovereigns with large fiscal 
imbalances that, in turn, result in high costs to hold such sovereign bonds due to high 
haircuts in the repo markets (Mitchell and Pulvino, 2010). 
Thus, deteriorating market liquidity appears to be the driving force behind high 
sovereign spreads and CDS. In terms of economic policy, given the current degree of 
markets’ pessimism regarding the prospects of public finances in the euro-area and 
worldwide, one could advise to enhance the scope and the scale of monetary policy. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix Figure 1 Impulse response of Greek CDS over swaps to Euribor 3M 
 
 
Appendix Figure 2 Impulse response of Irish CDS over swaps to Euribor 3M 
 
 
Appendix Figure 3 Impulse response of Greek CDS over swaps to Eurepo 3M 
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Appendix Figure 4 Impulse response of Irish CDS over swaps to Eurepo 3M 
 
 
Appendix Figure 5 Impulse response of Greek CDS over swaps to iTraxx 
 
 
Appendix Figure 6 Impulse response of Greek CDS over swaps to iTraxx 
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Appendix Figure 7 Impulse response of Greek CDS over swaps to debt 
 
 
Appendix Figure 8 Impulse response of Irish CDS over swaps to debt 
 
 
Appendix Figure 9 Impulse response of Greek CDS over swaps to the difference between Euribor and Eurepo 
3M 
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Appendix Figure 10 Impulse response of Irish CDS over swaps to the difference between Euribor and Eurepo 
3M 
 
 
